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Abstract
.In this paper we examine the possibility of earmarking inheritance
taxes to the ﬁnancing of a transfer to the poor, aimed at reducing the
payoﬀ from small crime and at fostering the fulﬁllment of basic social
responsibilities. A simple model of a society in which there are two types
of agents either supplying legal labor or participating in criminal activity
is presented. The eﬀects of the transfer are examined with reference to
two policy designs and to attitudes toward risk of the agents. Financing
the transfer through inheritance taxation may be advisable as a way of
collecting the needed revenue from agents who are likely to maintain
strong enough incentives to good conduct.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Estate, inheritance and gift taxes are under attack. Many countries have made great
strides in reducing their scope or, as in Italy, abolishing them altogether. Criticism
of this type of tax are based on1:
— the large opportunity for avoidance they oﬀer, and the resources wasted on
ﬁnding and exploiting loopholes in the tax law;
— the predicted distortionary eﬀects upon choices pertaining to work, savings,
and to business and residential location;
— wide-spread concern about the oversized public sector;
— the limited revenue collected through this type of tax, which makes further
reductions or cancellation only a mild adjustment for the government, yet highly
visible to taxpayers.
Criticism thus hinges primarily upon eﬃciency considerations. The public sector
is not deemed capable of utilizing revenue more eﬃciently than the private and
speciﬁc distorsions are produced by this type of tax. Abolitionists ﬁnd that the
aforementioned problems overwhelm classical equity considerations centered on the
potential role of estate taxes in narrowing the gaps between starting points and
reducing wealth and income inequality.
In this paper, we explore the possibility of reformulating the tax, addressing ar-
eas of primary concern. With reference to the problem of controlling government
growth, abolition of death duties is not necessary. One approach to resolving this
problem is to earmark estate, inheritance and gift tax revenue, and to increase tax
exemptions for transfers to charities and cultural foundations. This approach in-
hibits government’s discretionary use of collected resources and favors either private
choice regarding revenue allocation (through donations to meritorious institutions),
1For a survey, see Kaplow [4].
2or public choice (as opposed to government choice) concerning the earmarked ex-
penditure. While other eﬃciency drawbacks of estate taxes are more diﬃcult to
correct, one can envisage a system of earmarking funds aimed at increasing the over-
all eﬃciency of the economic system, thus providing some kind of balance against
remaining ineﬃciencies. In this paper we examine the earmarking of death duties
revenue for the ﬁnancing of a citizenship dividend to the poor, conditional on ful-
ﬁlment of basic social responsibilities (e.g. compulsory school attendance, tax and
environment law compliance, eﬀort to earn income, avoidance of crime). Revenue
would thus be devoted to the correction of the externality stemming from the “licence
to commit small crimes” for those who do not receive any share of the inheritance
and are so poor as to be unable to bear monetary sanctions. The basic idea is that
of a “social inheritance”, which, while accepted by the heir, implies legacy duties
that must be fulﬁlled. One possibility is to make the payment directly conditional
upon the veriﬁcation of compliance with the speciﬁed duties, at some critical age2.
From this point of view, the dividend should foster the individual’s full liability for
monetary sanctions for misconduct even at low income levels, and help to enforce
socially advantageous behavior. Within a beneﬁt principle approach, donors and
bequeathers should see the social inheritance as a way of providing their heirs with
a more favorable social environment. From an eﬃciency point of view, inheritance
conveys information about the heir, who thanks to the assets received is likely to
belong to the group of people “easily punishable” through monetary sanctions and
capable of bearing the burden of ﬁnancing the transfer.
The social inheritance dividend is likely to give rise to some eﬃciency problems
typical of negative income taxation in terms of income eﬀects and disincentives to
work eﬀort. In the paper we assess the scope of these problems.
2Legal age seems a natural reference point. Very young age classes are often characterized by a
higher than the mean frequency of property crimes (see e.g. [3]).
3A stream of literature to which this paper is closely linked is that about redistri-
bution as a means for reducing crime. Demoguin and Schwager [2] especially have
clearly and forcefully argued in favor of social transfers as a means for attaining
low levels of crime without incurring prohibitive costs. Demoguin and Schwager
also present suggestive evidence3 of the contrasting scenarios in the USA (where
law enforcement expenditure is quite high but crime rates are as well) and Europe
(where social transfers may be counted as partial but quite eﬀective substitutes for
law enforcement expenditure). While our model is partially based on the approach
of Demoguin and Schwager [2], there are some signiﬁcant diﬀerences: we take into
account agents risk aversion and labor supply as a continuous variable, we model
small crime as a negative non depletable externality (rather than as damage for the
victim alone4) and we focus on monetary sanctions rather than imprisonment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the objective function
of the prospective heirs and state separability conditions that ease further analysis;
in Section 3 we describe a society made up of two agent groups and discuss the
equilibrium externality level under diﬀerent assumptions about labor supply. In
Section 4 we discuss the earmarking of inheritance tax revenue to social transfers
when agents exhibit constant absolute or constant relative risk aversion. In Section
5 we discuss the policy in comparison with available alternatives and draw some
conclusions.
3With reference to 1990 U.S. state-level data, Imrohoro˘ glu et al. [3] ﬁnd instead no correlation
between per capita expenditure on public welfare and the property crime rate.
4While private damages stemming e.g. from property crime may to some extent be corrected by
private expenditure on protection, the unsafe environment that arises when the crime rate is high
is a public bad.
42 The agent’s problem
Let us assume that each agent aims at maximizing the following weakly separable
concave utility function:
V (L,U(C))
where L is leisure and C is consumption, which are both normal goods. Consumption
is a random variable:
C(h1,h 2)=wh1 + ψ(h2) − cE (1)
where w is the legal work salary, h1 is time devoted to legal work (henceforth activity
1) and h2 time devoted to an illegal activity (activity 2); h1 + h2 + L ≤ M,w h e r e
M is a global time constraint.
Activity 2 originates externalities, which are born by everyone, with the exception
of a small group of agents suﬀering from social alienation. The negative external-
ities considered here originate mainly from socially disapproved conduct and small
wrongdoings or crimes (pickpocketing, noisy drunkenness, irregular waste disposal
etc.). As social alienation provides a kind of solidarity among those who suﬀer from
it, we assume that the group of socially alienated agents do not suﬀer from these
externalities. In (1) c is the unit cost of externalities for the victim; E is the total
amount of externalities. Remuneration of activity 2 is:
ψ(h2)=bih2 with probability (1 − p);
= −a − sh2 with probability p,
if wh1 − cE ≥ a + sh2 and h2 > 0;
= −(wh1 − cE) with probability p,
if wh1 − cE < a + sh2 and h2 > 0
=0 with probability p,i fh2 =0
5that is, the agent, engaging in the illegal activity receives a remuneration bi,w h i c h
is a money measure of the subjectively felt advantages of the activity. However, the
agent loses that remuneration and bears a linear penalty if detected (with probability
p) and provided that her income is high enough to bear the loss. If the agent has too
low an income, she loses it entirely if detected5. Monetary sanctions seem to be more
apt to ﬁt the type of crime considered in the paper, while resorting to imprisonment
may violate marginal deterrence6. We refer to a penalty with a ﬁxed component
as a simple modelling strategy to introduce the problem of agents “hard to punish”
due to lack of resources7. Moreover, in practice, ﬁxed components or lump-sums are
quite frequent in monetary sanctions.
As the utility function considered is weakly separable, a necessary condition for
maximizing the agents utility is the maximization of the subutility function U(C),
that must be ensured together with the optimal allocation of time to leisure and
work. We shall mainly focus on the implications of this necessary condition, quoting
U(C) as the agent’s utility function, with a little abuse of language. We assume that
U(C) exhibits risk aversion.
5That is wh1 is used to partially pay for the sanction, while detection implies the loss of bih2.
As a consequence the agent enters the group of socially alienated, and she does no longer bear the
eﬀect of negative externalities. Hence the agent’s consumption in this case is zero.
6Often alternative sanctions (such as serving in social activities) are mandated for the types
of misconduct being considered. As, however, the duties imposed can be violated in turn, fur-
ther enforcement must always be available either through monetary sanctions or other forms of
enforcement (imprisonment, etc.).
7Even without this ﬁxed penalty component, the problem of too low an income to bear the
sanction could be originated e.g. by a minimum time requirement of activity 2,t h a ti m p l i e st h a t
income received from activity 1 is not enough to pay the proportional penalty; or from a productivity
level too low to ﬁnd a job in activity 1 altogether.
63T h e t w o t y p e s o c i e t y
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that there are two types of agents, char-
acterized by either high or low productivity. They will be referred to by the index
i = r, p. With reference to the illegal activity, remunerations bi within each group
are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. Highly productive agents comprise
a large majority, and their number is Nr > 1. Given their salary wr for activity 1,






or expected sanction8 p(br
i + s) is equal to or greater than the additional remuner-
ation that activity 2 secures in comparison with activity 1,f o rbr
i ≤ 1. This implies
that, as long as they are fully liable, their preferred choice, in order to maximize
U(C), is to give up any illegal activity. Moreover, agents in the high productivity
group are not interested in becoming not liable by giving up legal work, as:
(1 − p)U(hr
2(br
i) − cE) ≤ U (hr
1(wr)wr − cE) (2)
where the l.h.s. refers to the expected utility of a not liable agent who specializes
in activity 2 and is characterized by br
i =1 , while the r.h.s. refers to the certain
utility of the one who specializes in activity 1.I n( 2 )hr
2(br
i) is the preferred amount of
hours of work chosen by the aforementioned agent who specializes in activity 2, while
hr
1(wr) is the preferred amount in case of specialization in activity 1. Specialization
arises in case of lack of liability as, whenever br
i ≥ wr, it ensures the largest expected
utility for the agent who wants to perform activity 2 (because in case of detection
8Only marginal sanction is relevant with reference to marginal conditions for utility maximiza-
tion. bi must be taken into account in addition to s because detected agents lose their remuneration.
7she always loses everything no matter how much activity done)9.I n t h e o p p o s i t e
case, whenever wr >b r
i(1 − p), a mixed choice cannot outperform specialization in
activity 1.
High productive agents thus always prefer activity 1. They are victims of the
externalities, but do not produce them.
Low productive agents group is less large (we assume Np =1 ). They earn a
salary wp < (1 − p), which is lower than the highest expected remuneration of the
illegal activity. Moreover, their low salary implies that they cannot bear the loss due
to the penalty, as wpM<a , so that even for a very low engagement in activity 2
they cannot pay it. Hence their prospect in case of detection is the loss of the whole
income.
We assume that low productive agents do not bear any cost for externalities
produced by other people. We expect again that they specialize in one of the two
activities, for the reasons already clariﬁed. The low productive agent’s decision about
which activity to embrace depends upon the value bi of the subject; it is based on
an inequality similar to (2). To have a clearer picture, we assume for the moment
that the labor supply by this social group is inelastic and ﬁxed at level hp in both
activities, and we specify the utility function as an exponential, characterized by
constant absolute risk aversion. We solve it for b
p
i in order to determine the activity
2 remuneration level that is small enough to command the choice of activity 110.W e
solve the following inequality:
{1 − exp[−α(hpwp)]} ≥ (1 − p){1 − exp[−α(hpb
p
i)]} (3)
where on the l.h.s. the utility of the agent who works legally is considered, while on
9That is, specialization in activity 2 maximizes the value of the l.h.s. of (2), which does not
imply however that the utility so reached is higher than that available from activity 1, described in
the r.h.s.; inequality will hold only for speciﬁc values of the parameters.
10We rely on the standard assumption that an agent who is indiﬀerent between legal and illegal
activity chooses the ﬁrst.
8the r.h.s. there is the expected utility of the agent engaged in the illegal activity,















(1−p) (applying de L’Hopital’s rule), that is the wage provided for
legal work must be greater than or equal to the expected remuneration from illegal
activity in case of risk neutrality, to make activity 1 the preferred one11.
The b
p∗
i value that equates the two sides of 4, thanks to the assumption of uniform
distribution on the interval [0,1], and by assuming that for this type of agents Np =
1, also measures the number of compliers among the low productive agents. The
complement to one is the number of agents who engage in the illegal activity. Hence
the total amount of externality produced is (1 − b
p∗
i )hP. Note that the number of
honest agents b
p∗
i is increasing in wp.
In the more general case, the amount of hours worked in activity 2 varies as a
function of b
p
i, while the preferred amount of hours worked in activity 1 does not
depend on b
p
i because of the agent’s specialization. While labor supply in activity 2





must be increasing in b
p
i. Hence, it is still possible to ﬁnd a b
p∗
i value that separates
those who choose activity 1 from those who choose activity 2. If labor supply in
activity 2 is backward bending, b
p∗
i is pushed up. The opposite eﬀect obtains if
labor supply in activity 2 constantly increases in b
p
i.
11To ensure that the right hand side in (4) is well deﬁned we assume p<exp[−α(hpwp)].
94 The role of the inheritance tax
Let us now consider an enlarged version of the static model so far considered. Each
high productive agent has now an additional source for ﬁnancing her consumption,
that is an inheritance that amounts to B>0 received from her mother12,w h o
in deciding about it was motivated by altruistic considerations. High productive
agents may consider the possibility of introducing by majority voting an inheritance
taxation13 in order to ﬁnance a transfer to low productive agents. The logic is that
of increasing the opportunity cost of illegal behavior, in order to raise welfare, by
reducing the amount of externalities.
It is assumed on the other hand that transferring the revenue collected through
taxation to the low productive agents implies increasing costs, so that total costs of
the policy are given by f(g)BN ≥ gBN,w h e r e0 ≤ g ≤ 1 is the net rate of transfer14
and each high productive agent bears a cost of f(g)B. We assume also that f(0) = 0,
f0(0) = 1, f0 > 0, f” > 0 and f0(g)=∞, that is actual marginal taxation rate is
higher than the legal one and is increasing; it becomes prohibitive at g,r e ﬂecting the
maximum of the Laﬀer curve. Financing the transfer through inheritance taxation
may in fact introduce distorsions into the decedent’s choice about the inheritance
to bequeath15, alongside with avoidance activities. As long as the proposed policy,
however, induces a net increase in the high productive agents utility, they should
vote in favor of it. So should the low productive agents who beneﬁtf r o mt h et r a n s f e r .
12For simpliﬁcation we refer to a one-parent one-daugther society.
13In this static model inheritances are treated as gifts. We focus upon inheritances received.
Bequests are included within each high productive agent’s consumption expenditure.
14Within this approach a transfer paid to every citizen would increase redistribution costs without
adding anything in terms of externality control. A universalistic approach (e.g. through a citizen-
ship dividend), however, may be valuable if it implies a change in the redistribution technology
which reduces costs (e.g. because eligibility need not be veriﬁed).
15Also the number of hours of work of highly productive agents might be aﬀected by inheritance
taxation. The f(g) function is meant to include also this type of distorsion.
10The utility function of a high productive agent when the inheritance is received
and the taxation-transfer policy is implemented becomes:
1 − exp{−α[wrhr
1(wr) − cE(g)+[ 1− f(g)]B]}. (5)
As it has been assumed that income is a normal good, and as beneﬁting from the
inheritance the heir must feel richer, after inheriting and after the implementation
of an advantageous taxation-transfer policy, she should still be fully deterred from
illegal activity.
4.1 The taxation/transfer policy with constant absolute risk-
aversion
T h ec h o i c ep r o b l e mo ft h ep o o ra g e n ti sm o d i ﬁed when she is entitled to a transfer16
gBN, which would be lost only if she is detected performing an illegal activity. Let
us also assume for the moment that the labor supply of the low productive agent in
both activities is inelastic and ﬁxed at level hp. Moreover, the transfer is not large
enough to render the agent liable. By rewriting the choice problem of the agent
when the transfer is provided for, we ﬁnd the b
p∗














It can be veriﬁed that the frequency of poor agents who choose activity 1 increases at







accordingly. On the other hand, transfers also have strictly increasing marginal
costs. An example in which the policy is worthwhile is illustrated in Figure 1,w h e r e
g∗∗ refers to the transfer level which implies that b∗
i (g)=1 , so that there are never





Figure 1: The transfer is worthwhile until level g*
reasons for increasing the transfer further17.
Even when the transfer is set at a level that induces elimination of the externality,
this does not always imply equalizing incomes, as the tax may take away only part
of the inheritance received, and as the salary of the high productive agent may from
the outset be much higher than the level needed to ensure the preference for activity
1 on the part of low productive agents.
What happens if the amount of hours worked by the poor drops in both activities
as a consequence of the transfer via the income eﬀect? Even in this case there is
still a unique solution to equation (3), for each given gBN level, as the l.h.s. does
not depend on bi while the r.h.s. is still increasing in it. Even if the labor supply
is backward bending, income from activity 2,b e i n gan o r m a lg o o d ,c a n n o td e c r e a s e
17The transfer could stop beforehand also if low productive agents become liable and thus fully
deterred by the current sanction.
12if work remuneration increases. In this case, however, the stimulating eﬀect of the
transfer on good conduct could somewhat be reduced, to the extent that the transfer
received partially substitutes for earned income instead of adding to it in order to
increase the preference for legal conduct. To point out the eﬀects, we rewrite (3) as
an equality which highlights the role of the transfer:































i + gBN. It turns out that,
whenever labor supply in activity 2 is upward sloping (and hence the denominator
is positive), the transfer has a positive eﬀect on b
p∗
i and increases compliance the
more, the larger is the drop of hours in activity 2 and the lower it is in activity 1.
While overall perverse eﬀects of the policy cannot be excluded, some beneﬁcial eﬀect
upon the amount of externalities should at any rate be caused by the reduction in
the amount of hours worked by those who choose activity 2.
An alternative to the transfer design considered so far is that of linking the
transfer to legal work, for example by granting a gross salary of wp+gw,w h e r egw is
a transfer so calculated as to balance the budget. A bonus on wage income has been
suggested in the literature that considers poverty as a source of negative externalities.
Zeckhauser [6] argues in favor of it in a model in which the representative (rich)
citizen would like the poor to have a higher income and to perform additional hours
of work. Wane [5] considers a modiﬁed problem of optimal taxation, in which the
p o v e r t yi n d e xn e g a t i v e l ya ﬀects social welfare, and shows that the marginal unit of
earned income should be subsidized for the poor.
In our model, by suitably reformulating (6), one can show that b
p∗
i (gw) increases
13at increasing rates in gw,g i v e naﬁxed total time of work hp. The targeted trans-
fer raises the relative price of crime; it performs a kind of Pigouvian externality
correction, and thus conforms to eﬃciency goals.
On the other hand, a subsidy that raises wp is likely to modify the chosen h
p
1.A s ,
however, income from activity 1 increases (more if the substitution eﬀect dominates,
and less if the income eﬀect dominates), while income from activity 2 stays the same,
the consequences upon compliance are always beneﬁcial18.
4.2 The taxation/transfer policy with constant relative risk
aversion
The eﬀects of the transfers so far considered are to a large extent driven by the
characteristics of the CARA utility function, which implies increasing relative risk
aversion. The richer the socially alienated agent becomes, the higher her relative
risk aversion and the larger the beneﬁts in terms of preference for activity 1.
What about the eﬀects in case of a CRRA utility function? In this case, when










where β is relative risk aversion. By introducing an unconditional income transfer
gBN and solving for b
p∗













18Zeckhauser [6] considers a linear taxation that, besides the subsidy aimed at increasing income
from work, includes a ﬁxed tax that controls for the income eﬀect. This approach however implies
that, if the poor does not work, her after tax income becomes negative. An implication which is,
however, at odds with the limited liability approach followed in this paper.
14To ﬁnd out the eﬀect of the transfer, we derive b
p∗













The sign of the derivative depends upon the value of relative risk aversion β.I fi ti s
greater than 1 the sign is negative; if it is lower it is positive. Thus for a high enough
relative risk aversion level, raising the income of the poor agent does not result in
lower externality production, as the agent’s absolute risk aversion decreases and she
is more likely to choose activity 2. On the other hand this negative eﬀect could be
somewhat reduced if we allow for modiﬁcations of the time of work as a consequence
of the income eﬀect, as the number of hours worked by those who choose activity 2
may decrease.
A more suitable approach seems that of designing the transfer as a ﬁxed increment









In this case the number of complying agents increases linearly in gw and we have a
well behaved problem of maximization of the high productive agent’s utility (5). The








Even if the number of hours of work is modiﬁed in activity 1 as a consequence of the
transfer, the direction of the eﬀect is at any rate towards increasing the frequency
of compliers, as noted in the case of a CARA utility function.
155 Policy assessment
Even if our exempliﬁcation of possible utility functions is far from exhaustive, the
case for transfers aimed at speciﬁcally improving the reward to good conduct seems
strong. In this paper we thus restate the result of Demoguin and Schwager [2] in
favor of functional or Pareto-eﬃcient income redistribution organized by the state,
with an important qualiﬁcation. If the agent’s risk aversion is taken into account,
pure income transfers can be counterproductive, to the extent that their main eﬀect
is that of reducing risk aversion. However redistributive policies to foster good
conduct may still have a role if they introduce suitable incentives. While our model
is structured with reference to the choice of either legal or illegal work, obviously
transfers may reward the choice of any socially valuable conduct.
While the model is static and does not allow for any distinction between income
and wealth, it seems natural to consider a redistribution policy ﬁnanced through
inheritance taxation as a redistribution of wealth. One way of implementing the
transfer part of the policy could be, for example, the “Child trust fund” ﬁnanced by
the government under the name of newly born children, as recently designed in the
United Kingdom.
Inheritance taxation earmarked to ﬁnance the transfer may be beneﬁcial, pro-
vided that costs borne to raise and redistribute its revenue are not too high. While
tax base elasticity to the tax rates is diﬃcult to assess (as in case of income or con-
sumption taxation), one can note that some of the observed costs due to avoidance
activities derive from the “closure” nature of the death taxes with reference to other
forms of income and wealth taxation, so that cancelling them would mainly transfer
these costs toward avoiding other taxes. Moreover, distortions upon the decedent
are excluded by deﬁnition when the inheritance occurs by chance, without any plan
on the part of the bequeather.
16What about resorting to other possible sources to ﬁnance the transfer aimed at
reducing small crime, as an alternative to the policy examined in this paper? The
most suitable alternative is an income or a consumption tax19: e.g., one could re-
sort to a negative income tax, to collect revenue from highly productive agents and
(hopefully20) from criminals, and to support honest low productive agents. The
income diﬀerentials among these three groups however need not be large, and intro-
ducing the correct amount of progressivity may prove diﬃcult. If there is a risk of
introducing perverse incentives, resorting to inheritance taxation may be a way of
exploiting the information that inheritance conveys. Within the model, by assump-
tion, inheritance is received only by highly productive agents who are beneﬁted by
the policy considered. In the real world, assets inherited enhance the heir’s ﬁnancial
liability, thus signalling21 that she is likely to belong to the group of agents easy
to deter. If inheritance taxation provides for suitable exemption levels, it can also
avoid diluting the heir’s incentives for good conduct. Moreover, heirs often receive
from their parents also contributions to human capital formation, which are ignored
by wealth taxes, but which in fact contribute to enhance the heir’s potential income
and liability for misconduct. Inheritance is thus likely to be a valuable signal also
from this point of view.
While inheritance taxation is thus worth considering for the ﬁnancing of trans-
fers, one must also take into account that the proceeds of the death taxes in many
countries are small and diﬃcult to increase. Hence it seems likely that the transfer
policy under consideration can only partially be ﬁnanced this way and additional
19Whithin the static model considered in the paper, they would have the same base. As we
have assumed a weakly separable utility function, optimal taxation principles suggest that a well
designed income tax need not be supplemented by taxation on goods (e.g. on bequests). See also
Kaplow [4].
20Remuneration bi of illegal activity only represents a subjective monetary equivalent of activity
2 beneﬁts, and it may be diﬃcult to correctly assess it as a tax base.
21For the signalling role of inheritances, in a diﬀerent context, see Cremer and Pestieau [1].
17revenue sources would be needed.
An alternative to any taxation/transfer policy is represented by an increase in
the probability of detection to reduce misconduct. In fact, in the model considered
there is an upper constraint on the penalty (which cannot exceed income). While a
penalty increase is ruled out, raising the probability of detection reduces the beneﬁts
of those who engage in activity 2, thereby providing a substitute for transfers in
order to reduce externalities. Increasing the probability of detection, however, may
be quite problematic. On the one hand, only if this probability is set at 1 can the
externality be eradicated. Otherwise, a small expected beneﬁt still remains available
for non liable agents, which implies that someone will choose activity 2. The second
problem is linked to the costs of increasing the detection probability. Costs are likely
to be sharply increasing and to become prohibitive when the desired probability
approaches 1. Hence some transfers are likely to provide a less costly approach,
at least when the desired externality reduction is large and the opportunity for
increasing the probability of detection at low costs has been exploited. Last but not
least, very high detection probabilities for small crimes or unpleasant social conduct
are likely to be incompatible with a liberal society, which aims at guaranteeing the
p r i v a c yo fc h o i c e sa n dw a y so fl i f e .
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